Even as end-to-end encrypted communication becomes more popular, private messaging remains a challenging problem due to metadata leakages, such as who is communicating with whom. Most existing systems that hide communication metadata either (1) do not scale easily, (2) incur significant overheads, or (3) provide weaker guarantees than cryptographic privacy, such as differential privacy or heuristic privacy. This paper presents XRD (short for Crossroads), a metadata private messaging system that provides cryptographic privacy, while scaling easily to support more users by adding more servers. At a high level, XRD uses multiple mix networks in parallel with several techniques, including a novel technique we call aggregate hybrid shuffle. As a result, XRD can support 2 million users with 251 seconds of latency with 100 servers. This is 12× and 3.7× faster than Atom and Pung, respectively, which are prior scalable messaging systems with cryptographic privacy.
Introduction
Many Internet users today have turned to end-to-end encrypted communication like TLS [18] and Signal [36] , to protect the content of their communication in the face of widespread surveillance. While these techniques are starting to see wide adoption, they unfortunately do not protect the metadata of communication, such as the timing, the size, and the identities of the end-points. In scenarios where the metadata are sensitive (e.g., a government officer talking with a journalist for whistleblowing), encryption alone is not sufficient to protect users' privacy.
Given its importance, there is a rich history of works that aim to hide the communication metadata, starting with mix networks (mix-nets) [10] and dining-cryptographers networks (DC-Nets) [11] in the 80s. Both works provide formal privacy guarantees against global adversaries, which has inspired many systems with strong security guarantees [14, 47, 31, 46] . However, mix-nets and DC-nets require the users' messages to be processed by either centralized servers or every user in the system, making them difficult to scale to millions of users. Systems that build on them typically inherit the scalability limitation as well, with overheads increasing (often superlinearly) with the number of users or servers [14, 47, 31, 46] . For private communication systems, however, supporting a large user base is imperative to providing strong security; as aptly stated by prior works, "anonymity loves company" [20, 42] . Intuitively, the adversary's goal of learning information about a user naturally becomes harder as the number of users increases.
As such, many recent messaging systems have been targeting scalability as well as formal security guarantees. Systems like Stadium [45] and Karaoke [33] , for instance, use differential privacy [22] to bound the information leakage on the metadata. Though this has allowed the systems to scale to more users with better performance, both systems leak a small bounded amount of metadata for each message, and thus have a notion of "privacy budget". A user in these systems then spends a small amount of privacy budget every time she sends a sensitive message, and eventually is not guaranteed strong privacy. Users with high volumes of communication could quickly exhaust this budget, and there is no clear mechanism to increase the privacy budget once it runs out. Scalable systems that provide stronger cryptographic privacy like Atom [30] or Pung [4] , on the other hand, do not have such a privacy budget. However, they rely heavily on expensive cryptographic primitives such as public key encryption and private information retrieval [2] . As a result, they suffer from high latency, in the order of ten minutes or longer for a few million users, which impedes their adoption.
Related work
In this section, we discuss related work by categorizing the prior systems primarily by their privacy properties, and also discuss the scalability and performance of each system. Systems with cryptographic privacy. Mix-nets [10] and DC-Nets [11] are the earliest examples of works that provide cryptographic (or even information theoretic) privacy guarantees against global adversaries. Unfortunately, they have two major issues. First, they are weak against active attackers: adversaries can deanonymize users in mix-nets by tampering with messages, and can anonymously deny service in DC-Nets. Second, they do not scale to large numbers of users because all messages must be processed by either a small number of servers or every user in the system. Many systems that improved on the security of these systems against active attacks [14, 47, 31, 46] suffer from similar scalability bottlenecks. Riposte [13] , a system that uses "private information storage" to provide anonymous broadcast, also requires all servers to handle a number of messages proportional to the number of users, and thus faces similar scalability issues.
A recent system Atom [30] targets both scalability and strong anonymity. Specifically, Atom can scale horizontally, allowing it to scale to larger numbers of users simply by adding more servers to the network. At the same time, it provides sender anonymity [40] (i.e., no one, including the recipients, learns who sent which message) against an adversary that can compromise any fraction of the servers and users. However, Atom employs expensive cryptography, and requires the message to be routed through hundreds of servers in series. Thus, Atom incurs high latency, in the order of tens of minutes for a few million users.
Pung [4, 3] is a system that aims to provide metadata private messaging between honest users with cryptographic privacy. This is a weaker notion of privacy than that of Atom, as the recipients (who are assumed to be honest) learn the senders of the messages. However, unlike most prior works, Pung can provide private communication even if all servers are malicious by using a cryptographic primitive called computational private information retrieval (CPIR) [12, 2] . Its powerful threat model comes unfortunately at the cost of performance: Though Pung scales horizontally, the amount of work required per user is proportional to the total number of users, resulting in the total work growing superlinearly with the number of users. Moreover, PIR is computationally expensive, resulting in throughput of only a few hundred or thousand messages per minute per server.
Systems with differential privacy. Vuvuzela [46] and its horizontally scalable siblings Stadium [45] and Karaoke [33] aim to provide differentially private (rather than cryptographically private) messaging. At a high level, they hide the communication patterns of honest users by inserting dummy messages that are indistinguishable from real messages, and reason carefully about how much information is leaked at each round. They then set the system parameters such that they could support a number of sensitive messages; for instance, Stadium and Karaoke target 10 4 and 10 6 messages, respectively. Up to that number of messages, the systems allow users to provide a plausible cover story to "deny" their actual actions. Specifically, the system ensures that the probability of Alice conversing with Bob from the adversary's perspective is within e ε (typically, e ε ∈ [3, 10]) of the probability of Alice conversing with any other user with only a small failure probability δ (typically, δ = 0.0001). This paradigm shift has allowed the systems to support larger numbers of users with lower latency than prior works.
Unfortunately, systems with differential privacy suffer from two drawbacks. First, the probability gap between two events may be sufficient for strong adversaries to act on. For instance, if Alice is ten times as likely to talk to Bob than Charlie, the adversary may act assuming that Alice is talking to Bob, despite the plausible deniability. Second, there is a "privacy budget" (e.g., 10 4 to 10 6 messages), meaning that a user can deny a limited number of messages with strong guarantees. Moreover, for best possible security, users must constantly send messages, and deny every message. For instance, Alice may admit that she is not in any conversation (thinking this information is not sensitive), but this could have unintended consequences on the privacy of another user who uses the cover story that she is talking with Alice. The budget could then run out quickly if users want the strongest privacy possible: If a user sends a message every minute, she would run out of her budget in a few days or years with 10 4 to 10 6 messages. Although the privacy guarantee weakens gradually after the privacy budget is exhausted, it is unclear how to raise the privacy levels once they have been lowered.
Scalable systems with other privacy guarantees. The only private communication system in wide-deployment today is Tor [21] . Tor currently supports over 2 million daily users using over 6,000 servers [1] , and can scale to more users easily by adding more servers. However, Tor does not provide privacy against an adversary that monitors significant portions of the network, and is susceptible to traffic analysis attacks [19, 28] . Its privacy guarantee weakens further if the adversary can control some servers, and if the adversary launches active attacks [27] . Similar to Tor, most free-route mix-nets [38, 23, 42, 15, 35] (distributed mix-nets where each messages is routed through a small subset of servers) cannot provide strong privacy against powerful adversaries due to traffic analysis and active attacks.
Loopix [41] is a recent iteration on free-route mix-nets, and can provide fast asynchronous messaging. To do so, each user interacts with a semi-trusted server (called "provider" in the paper), and routes her messages through a small number of servers (e.g., 3 servers). Each server inserts small amounts of random delays before routing the messages. Loopix then reasons about privacy using entropy. Unfortunately, the privacy guarantee of Loopix weakens quickly as the adversary compromises more servers. Moreover, Loopix requires the recipients to trust the provider to protect themselves.
System model and goals
XRD aims to achieve the best of all worlds by providing cryptographic metadata privacy while scaling horizontally without relying on expensive cryptographic primitives. In this section, we present our threat model and system goals.
Threat model and assumptions
A deployment of XRD would consist of hundreds to thousands of servers and a large number of users, in the order of millions. Similar to several prior works on distributed private communication systems [30, 45] , XRD assumes an adversary that can monitor the entire network, control a fraction f of the servers, and control up to all but two honest users. We assume, however, that there exists a public key infrastructure that can be used to securely share public keys of online servers and users with all participants at any given time. These keys, for example, could be maintained by key transparency schemes [32, 37, 44] .
XRD does not hide the fact that users are using XRD. Thus, for best possible security, users should stay online to avoid intersection attacks [29, 16] . XRD also does not protect against denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and in general does not provide strong availability guarantees. Defending against intersection and DoS attacks is an interesting future work. XRD does, however, provide privacy even under DoS, server churn, and user churn (e.g., Alice goes offline unexpectedly without her conversation partner knowing). We discuss the availability properties further in §5 and §8.3.
Finally, XRD assumes that the users can agree to start talking at a certain time out-of-band. This could be done, for example, via two users exchanging this information offline, or by using systems like Alpenhorn [34] that can initiate conversations privately.
Cryptographic primitives. XRD uses standard cryptographic primitives. It assumes existence of a group of prime order p with a generator g in which discrete log is hard and the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds. We will write DH(g a , b) = g ab to denote Diffie-Hellman key exchange. In addition, XRD makes use of authenticated encryption.
Authenticated encryption [5] : XRD relies on an authenticated encryption scheme for confidentiality and integrity, which consists of the following algorithms:
• c ← AEnc(s, nonce, m). Encrypt message m and authenticate the ciphertext c using a symmetric key s and a nonce nonce. Typically, s is used to derive two more keys, one for encryption and one for authentication (e.g., via HMAC).
• (b, m) ← ADec(s, nonce, c). Check the integrity of and decrypt ciphertext c using the key s and a nonce nonce. Figure 1 : Overview of XRD operation.
If the check fails, then b = 0 and m = ⊥. Otherwise, b = 1 and m is the underlying plaintext. XRD in particular relies on the following events having negligible probability when using authenticated encryption: (1) generating a correctly authenticated ciphertext without knowing the secret key used for ADec, and (2) the same ciphertext authenticating under two different keys. Both of these properties are true, for example, when using the encrypt-then-MAC authenticated encryption schemes.
Goals
XRD has three main goals.
Correctness. Informally, the system is correct if every honest user successfully communicates with her conversation partner after a successful execution of the system protocol.
Privacy. Similar to prior messaging systems [46, 4, 45, 33] , XRD aims to provide relationship unobservability [40] , meaning that the adversary cannot learn anything about the communication between two honest users. Informally, consider any honest users Alice, Bob, and Charlie. The system provides privacy if the adversary cannot distinguish whether Alice is communicating with Bob, Charlie, or neither. XRD only guarantees this property among the honest users, as malicious conversation partners can trivially learn the metadata of their communication. We provide a more formal definition in Appendix B. (This is a weaker privacy goal than that of Atom [30] , which aims for sender anonymity.)
Scalability. Similar to prior work [30] , we require that the system can handle more users with more servers. If the number of messages processed by a server is C(M, N) for M users and N servers, we require that C(M, N) → 0 as N → ∞. C(M, N) should approach zero polynomially in N so that adding a server introduces significant performance benefits. Figure 1 presents the overview of a XRD network. At a high level, XRD consists of three different entities: users, mix servers, and mailbox servers. Every user in XRD has a unique mailbox associated with her, similar to an e-mail address. The mailbox servers maintain the mailboxes, and are only trusted for availability and not privacy.
XRD overview
To set up the network, XRD organizes the mix servers into many chains of servers such that there exists at least one honest server in each chain with overwhelming probability (i.e., an anytrust group [47] ). Communication in XRD is carried out in discrete rounds. In each round, each user selects a fixed set of chains, where the set is determined by the user's public key. She then sends a fixed size message to each of the selected chains. (If the message is too small or large, then the user pads the message or breaks it into multiple pieces.) Each message contains a destination mailbox, and is onionencrypted for all servers in the chain.
Once all users' messages are submitted, each chain acts as a local mix-net [10] , decrypting and shuffling messages. During shuffling, each server also generates a short proof that allows other servers to check that it behaved correctly. If the proof does not verify, then the protocol halts with no privacy leakage. If all verification succeeds, then the last server in each chain forwards the messages to the appropriate mailbox servers. (The protocol is described in detail in §6.) Finally, the mailbox servers put the messages into the appropriate mailboxes, and each user downloads all messages in her mailbox at the end of a round.
The correctness and security of XRD is in large part due to how each user selects the mix-nets and the destination of each message. As we will see in §5, the users are required to follow a specific algorithm to select the chains. The algorithm guarantees that every pair of users have at least one chain in common and the choices of the chains are publicly computable. For example, every user selecting the same chain will achieve this property, and thus correctness and security. In XRD, we achieve this property while distributing the load evenly.
Let us now consider two scenarios: (1) a user Alice is not in a conversation with anyone, or (2) Alice is in a conversation with another user Bob. In the first case, she sends a dummy message encrypted for herself to each chain that will come back to her own mailbox. We call these messages loopback messages. In the second case, Alice and Bob compute each other's choices of chains, and discover at which chain they will intersect. If there are multiple such chains, they break ties in a deterministic fashion. Then, Alice and Bob send the messages encrypted for the other person, which we call conversation messages, to their intersecting chain. They also send loopback messages on all other chains.
Security properties
We now argue the security informally. We present a more formal definition and arguments of privacy in Appendix B. Since both types of messages are encrypted for owners of mailboxes and the mix-net hides the origin of a message, the adversary cannot tell if a message going to Alice's mailbox is a loopback message or a conversation message sent by a different user. This means that the network pattern of all users is the same from the adversary's perspective: each user sends and receives exactly messages, each of which could be a loopback or a conversation message. As a result, the adversary cannot tell if a user is in a conversation or not. Moreover, we choose the chains such that every pair of users intersects at some chain ( §5), meaning the probability that Alice is talking to another honest user is the same for all honest users. This hides the conversation metadata.
The analysis above, however, only holds if the adversary does not tamper with the messages. For instance, if the adversary drops Alice's message in a chain, then there are two possible observable outcomes in this chain: Alice receives (1) no message, meaning Alice is not in a conversation in this chain, or (2) one message, meaning someone intersecting with Alice at this chain is chatting with Alice. This information leakage breaks the security of XRD. We propose a new protocol called aggregate hybrid shuffle ( §6) that efficiently defends against such an attack.
Scalability properties
Let n and N be the number of chains and servers in the network, respectively. Each user must send at least √ n messages to guarantee every pair of users intersect. To see why, fix , the number of chains a user selects. Those chains must connect a user Alice to all M users. Since the total number of messages sent by users is M · , each chain should handle M· n messages if we distribute the load evenly. We then need M· n · ≥ M because the left hand side is the maximum number of users connected to the chains that Alice chose. Thus, ≥ √ n. In §5, we present an approximation algorithm that uses ≈ √ 2n to ensure all users intersect with each other while evenly distributing the work. This means that each chain handles ≈ √ 2M √ n messages, and thus XRD scales with the number of chains. If we set n = N and each server appears in k chains for k << √ N, this satisfies our scalability goal in §3.2:
XRD design
In this section, we present the detailed operations of a base XRD design that protects against an adversary that does not launch active attacks. We then describe modifications to this baseline design that allows XRD to protect against active attacks in §6.
Mailboxes and mailbox servers
Every user in XRD has a mailbox that is publicly associated with her. In our design, we use the public key of each user as the identifier for the mailbox, though different public identifiers like e-mail addresses can work as well. These mailboxes are maintained by the mailbox servers, with simple put and get functionalities to add and fetch messages to Algorithm 1 Mix server routing protocol Server i in a chain of k servers possesses its mixing key pair
In each round ρ, it receives a set of ciphertexts {c 2b. Forward messages to mailbox: If i = k, then each decrypted message is of the form (pk u , AEnc(s, ρ, m u )), where pk u is the public key of a user u, s is a secret key, and m u is a message for the user. Send the message to the mailbox server that manages mailbox pk u .
a mailbox. Similar to e-mail servers, different users' mailboxes can be maintained by different servers.
Mix chains
XRD uses many parallel mix-nets to process the messages. We now describe their formation and operations.
Forming mix chains
We require the existence of an honest server in every chain to guarantee privacy. To ensure this property, we use public randomness sources [7, 43] that are unbiased and publicly available to randomly sample k servers to form a chain, similar to prior works [30, 45] . We set k large enough such that the probability that all servers are malicious is negligible. Concretely, the probability that a chain of length k consists only of malicious servers is f k . Then, if we have n chains in total, the probability there exists a group of only malicious servers is less than n · f k via a union bound. Finally, we can upper bound this to be negligible. For example, if we want this probability to be less than 2 −64 for f = 20%, then we need k = 32 for n < 6000. This makes k depend logarithmically on N. In XRD, we set n = N for N servers, meaning each server appears in k chains on average.
Once the servers are selected, we "stagger" the position of a server in the chains to ensure maximal server utilization. For instance, if a server is part of two chains, then it could be the first server in one chain and the second server in the other chain. This optimization has no impact on the security, as we only require the existence of an honest server in each group. This helps minimize the idle time of each server.
Processing user messages
After the chains are created, each mix server i generates a mixing key pair (mpk i = g msk i , msk i ), where msk i is a random value in Z p and g is a generator of the group. The public mixing keys {mpk i } are made available to all participants in the network, along with the ordering of the keys in each chain. Now, each chain behaves as a simple mix-net [10] : users submit some messages onion-encrypted using the mixing keys ( §5.3), and the servers go in order decrypting and shuffling the messages. Algorithm 1 describes the protocol in detail. The honest server in each chain is responsible for hiding the origins of the messages against passive adversaries. We then protect against active attacks using a new technique described in §6.
Server churn
Some servers may go offline in the middle of a round. Though XRD does not provide additional fault tolerance mechanisms, only the chains that contain failing servers are affected. Furthermore, the failing chains do not affect the security since they do not disturb the operations of other chains and the destination of the messages at the failing chain remains hidden to the adversary. Thus, conversations that use chains with no failing servers are unaffected. We analyze the empirical effects of server failures in §8.3.
Users
We now describe how users operate in XRD.
Selecting chains
XRD needs to ensure that all users' choices of chains intersect at least once, and that the choices are publicly computable. We present a scheme that achieves this property. Upon joining the network, every user is placed into one of + 1 groups such that each group contains roughly the same number of users, and such that the group of any user is publicly computable. This could be done, for example, by assigning each user to a pseudo-random group based on the hash of the user's public key. Every user in a group is connected to the same servers specified as follows. Let C i be the ordered set of chains that users in group i are connected to. We start with C 1 = {1, . . . , }, and build the other sets inductively:
By construction, every group is connected to every other group: Group i is connected to group j via C i [ j] for all i < j. As a result, every user in group i is connected to all others in the same group (they meet at all chains in C i ), and is connected to users in group j via chain
To find the concrete value of , let us consider C . The last chain of C , which is the chain with the largest index, is
2 . This value should be as close as possible to n, the number of chains, to maximize utilization.
Sending messages
After choosing the mix chains, the users send one message to each of the chosen chains as described in Algorithm 2. At a high level, if Alice is not talking with anyone, Alice generates loopback messages by encrypting dummy Algorithm 2 User conversation protocol Consider two users Alice and Bob with key pairs (pk A = g sk A , sk A ) and (pk B = g sk B , sk B ) who are connected to sets of chains C A and C B ( §5.3.1). The network consists of chains 1, . . . , n, each with k servers. Alice and Bob possess the set of mixing keys for each chain. Alice performs the following in round ρ. 1a. Generate loopback messages: If Alice is not in a conversation, then Alice generates loopback messages:
A is a chain-specific symmetric key known only to Alice.
1b. Generate conversation message: If Alice is in a conversation with Bob, then she first computes the shared key s AB = DH(pk B , sk A ), and the symmetric encryption key for Bob s B = KDF(s AB , pk B ) where KDF is a key derivation function. Alice then generates the conversation message: m x AB = (pk B , AEnc(s B , ρ, msg)), where msg is the plaintext message for Bob and x AB ∈ C A ∩C B is the first chain in the intersection. She also generates − 1 loopback messages m x for x ∈ C A , x = x AB .
2. Onion-encrypt messages: For each message m x , let c k+1 = m x , and let {mpk i } be the mixing keys for chain x ∈ C A . For i = k to 1, generate a random value x i ∈ Z p , and compute
Send c 1 to chain x.
Fetch messages:
At the end of the round, fetch and decrypt the messages in her mailbox, using ADec with matching s
messages (e.g., messages with all zeroes) using a secret key known only to her, and submits them to the chosen chains. If she is talking with another user Bob, then she first finds where they intersect by computing the intersection of Bob's group and her group ( §5.3.1). If there is more than one such chain, then she breaks the tie by selecting the chain with the smallest index. Alice then generates − 1 loopback messages and one encrypted message using a secret key that Alice and Bob shares. Finally, Alice sends the message for Bob to the intersecting chain, and sends the loopback messages to the other chains. Bob mirrors Alice's actions.
User churn
Like servers, users might go offline in the middle of a round, and XRD aims to provide privacy in such situations. However, the protocol presented thus far does not achieve this goal. If Alice and Bob are conversing and Alice goes offline without Bob knowing, then Alice's mailbox will receive Bob's message while Bob's mailbox will get one fewer message. Thus, by observing mailbox access counts and Alice's availability, the adversary can infer their communication.
To solve this issue, we require Alice to submit two sets of messages in round ρ: the messages for the current round ρ, and cover messages for round ρ + 1. If Alice is not communicating with anyone, then the cover messages will be loop-back messages. If Alice is communicating with another user, then one of the cover messages will be a conversation message indicating that Alice has gone offline.
If Alice goes offline in round τ, then the servers use the cover messages submitted in τ −1 to carry out round τ. Now, there are two possibilities. If Alice is not in a conversation, then Alice's cover loopback messages are routed in round τ, and nothing needs to happen afterwards. If Alice is conversing with Bob, then at the end of round τ, Bob will get the message that Alice is offline via one of the cover messages. Starting from round τ + 1, Bob now sends loopback messages instead of conversation messages to hide the fact that Bob was talking with Alice in previous rounds. This could be used to end conversations as well. Malicious servers cannot fool Bob into thinking Alice has gone offline by replacing Alice's messages with her cover messages because the honest servers will ensure Alice's real messages are accounted for using our defenses described in §6.
Aggregate hybrid shuffle
Adversarial servers can tamper with the messages to leak privacy in XRD. For example, consider a mix-net chain where the first server is malicious. This malicious server can replace Alice's message with a message directed at Alice. Then, at the end of the mixing, the adversary will make one of two observations. If Alice was talking to another user Bob, Bob will receive one fewer message while Alice would receive two messages. The adversary would then learn that Alice was talking to Bob. If Alice is not talking to anyone on the tampered chain, then Alice would receive one message, revealing the lack of conversation on that chain.
Prior works [14, 47, 31, 45, 30] have used traditional verifiable shuffles [39, 24, 8, 26 ] to prevent these attacks. At a high level, verifiable shuffles allow the servers in the chain (one of which is honest) to verify the correctness of a shuffle of another server; namely, that the plaintexts underlying the outputs of a server is a valid permutation of the plaintexts underlying the inputs. Unfortunately, these techniques are computationally expensive, requiring many exponentiations.
In XRD, we make an observation that help us avoid traditional verifiable shuffles. For a meaningful tampering, the adversary necessarily has to tamper with the messages before they are shuffled by the honest server. Otherwise, the adversary does not learn the origins of messages. For example, after dropping a message in a server downstream from the honest server, the adversary might observe that Alice did not receive a message. The adversary cannot tell, however, whether the dropped message was sent by Alice or another user, and does not learn anything about Alice's communication pattern. (Intuitively, the adversarial downstream servers do not add any privacy in any case.) In this section, we describe a new form of verifiable shuffle we call aggregate hybrid shuffle (AHS) that allows us to take advantage of this fact. In particular, the protocol guarantees that the honest server will receive and shuffle all honest users' messages, or the honest server will detect that some parties upstream (some servers or users) misbehaved. We will then describe how the honest server can efficiently identify all malicious users and servers who deviated from the protocol, without affecting the privacy of honest users. The user and server protocols remain largely the same as the baseline protocols described in §5, with some crucial changes.
Key generation with AHS
Each server also has to prove to all other servers in zero-knowledge that it knows the private keys that match the public keys. All public keys are made available to all servers and users.
Sending messages with AHS
Once the servers' keys are distributed, user Alice can submit a message to a chain. To do so, Alice now employs a double-enveloping technique to encrypt her message [25] : she first onion-encrypts her message for all servers using the inner keys, and then onion-encrypts the result with the mixing keys. Let inner ciphertext be the result of the first onionencryption, and outer ciphertext be the final ciphertext. The inner ciphertexts are encrypted using ∏ i ipk i as the public key, which allows users to onion-encrypt in "one-shot": i.e., e = (g y , AEnc(DH(∏ i ipk i , y), ρ, m)) in round ρ with message m and a random y (Without y, DH(∏ i ipk i , y) can only be computed if all {isk i } are known). To generate the outer ciphertext, Alice performs the following.
1. Generate her outer Diffie-Hellman key: a random x ∈ Z p and (g x , x).
2. Generate a NIZK that proves she knows x that matches g x (using knowledge of discrete log proof [9] ).
3. Let c k+1 = e, and let {mpk i } for i ∈ [k] be the mixing keys of the servers in the chain. For i = k to 1, compute
is the final outer ciphertext. This is nearly identical to Algorithm 2, except that the user does not generate a fresh pair of Diffie-Hellman keys for each layer of encryption. To submit the message, Alice sends c and the NIZK to all servers in the chain.
Mixing with AHS
Before mixing begins in round ρ, the servers have
The servers first agree on the inputs for this round. This can be done, for example, by sorting the users' ciphertexts, hashing them using a cryptographic hash function, and then comparing the hashes. Then, starting with server 1, server i = 1, . . . , k perform the following:
Then, shuffle the keys using the same permutation as the one used to shuffle the ciphertexts.
3. Generate zero-knowledge proof: Generate a proof that
by generating a NIZK that shows log )} to server i + 1. When the last server finishes shuffling and no server reports any errors during mixing, our protocol guarantees that the honest server mixed all the honest users' messages successfully, meaning the users' privacy was protected. At this point, the servers reveal their private per-round inner keys {isk i }. With this, the last server can decrypt the inner ciphertexts to recover the users' messages.
To demonstrate the correctness of AHS (i.e., every message is successfully delivered if every participant followed the protocol), consider the key user j used to encrypt the message intended for server i and the Diffie-Hellman key server i receives. User j encrypts the message using the key DH(mpk i , x j ) = g x j ·msk i ∏ a<i bsk a . The Diffie-Hellman key server i receives is X j i = g x j ·∏ a<i bsk a . The key exchange then results in DH(X j i , msk i ) = g msk i ·x j ∏ a<i bsk a , which is the same as the one the user used.
Analysis. We now provide a brief security analysis of our scheme. This scheme provides protection against honestbut-curious adversaries as the inputs and outputs of an honest server look random: If decisional Diffie-Hellman is hard, then g x·bsk is indistinguishable from a random value given g x and g bsk for random x and bsk. Thus, by observing {g x j } (input) and {g x π( j) ·bsk } (output) of an honest server where π is the random permutation used to shuffle the messages, the adversary does not learn anything about the relationships between the inputs and outputs. We now provide a high level analysis that the honest server will always detect tampering by an upstream adversary. The detailed proof is shown in Appendix A. Let server h be the honest server. First, since we only need to consider upstream adversaries, we will consider all upstream malicious servers as one collective server with private blinding key bsk A = ∑ i<h bsk i . For the adversary to successfully tamper, it must generate {X bsk A ) msk h for j ∈ X T , the keys the users used to authenticate the messages, since Diffie-Hellman is hard. Thus, the adversary must change the users' Diffie-Hellman keys in order to generate authenticated ciphertexts that differ from the original ciphertexts; i.e., (X j 1 )
bsk A = X j h for j ∈ X T . Moreover, because all decryption operations must be successful to avoid detection, the adversary must know the keys used for authenticated decryption, which are (X j h ) msk h for j ∈ X T .
In the beginning of a round, the adversary controlled users have to prove the knowledge of discrete log of their Diffie-Hellman keys after seeing {X j 1 = g x j } from honest users. Then, the adversarial users' keys are generated independently of the honest users'. As a result, the goal of the adversary is essentially to find {X 
it knows (X j h ) msk h . This means that the adversary com-
msk h , where {x j } j∈X T and msk h are random values independent of bsk A . This breaks the Diffie-Hellman assumption, and thus the adversary must not be able to tamper with messages undetected.
Blame protocol
There are two ways an adversary could be detected: a NIZK fails to verify or an authenticated decryption fails. If a malicious user cannot generate a correct NIZK in step 2 in §6.2 or if a malicious server misbehaves and cannot generate a correct NIZK in step 3 in §6.3, then the misbehavior is detected and the adversary is immediately identified. In the case where a server finds some misauthenticated ciphertexts, the server can start a blame protocol that allows the server to identify who misbehaved. At a high level, the protocol guarantees that users are identified if and only if they purposefully sent misauthenticated ciphertexts. In addition, the protocol ensures that the privacy of honest users always remain protected, even if a malicious server tries to falsely accuse honest users. 
Similar to step 2, server h (the accusing server) reveals its
Diffie-Hellman exchanged key (X j h ) msk h , and shows that
) fails. If there are multiple problem ciphertexts, the blame protocol can be carried out in parallel for each ciphertext. Steps 1 and 2 can be done simultaneously as well. If the servers successfully carry out the blame protocol, then the servers have identified actively malicious users. At this point, those ciphertexts are removed from the set, and the upstream servers are required to repeat the AHS protocol; since the accusing servers have already removed all bad ciphertexts, the servers just have to repeat step 3 of §6.3 to show the keys were correctly computed. If any of the above steps fail, then the servers delete their private inner keys.
Analysis. The accusing server and the upstream servers are required to reveal the exchanged key used to decrypt the ciphertexts, and the correctness of the key exchange is proven through the two NIZKs in step 1 and step 2. Then, all servers (in particular, the honest server) can use the revealed keys to ensure that the submitted original ciphertext decrypts to the problem ciphertext. Thus, if a user submits misauthenticated ciphertext, then the servers get a verifiable chain of decryption starting with the outer ciphertext to the problem ciphertext, allowing the servers to identify the malicious user. (Intuitively, the outer ciphertext behaves as a commitment for the all layers of encryption.) Moreover, if an honest user submits a correctly authenticated ciphertext, she will never be accused successfully, since an honest user's ciphertext will authenticate at all layers. Thus, if a user is actively malicious, then she will be identified and removed.
Finally, even after a false accusation, the users' privacy is protected. After a malicious server accuses an honest user, the malicious server learns that either an outer ciphertext (if the server is upstream of server h) or an inner ciphertext (if the server is downstream of server h) originated from the user. In either case, the message remains encrypted for the honest server, by the mixing key in the former case or by the inner key in the latter case. The blame protocol will fail when the malicious server fails to prove that the honest user's ciphertext is misauthenticated, and the ciphertext will never be decrypted. As such, the adversary never learns the final destination of the user's message, and XRD protects the honest users' privacy.
Implementation
The XRD prototype is written in approximately 3,500 lines of Go. We used NaCl [6] for authenticated encryption, which internally uses ChaCha20 and Poly1305. The servers communicated using streaming gRPC over TLS. Our prototype assumes that the servers' and users' public keys, and the public randomness for creating the chains are provided by a higher level functionality. Finally, we set the number of chains n equal to the number of servers N ( §5.2.1).
Evaluation
In this section, we investigate the cost of users and the performance of XRD for different network configurations. For majority of our experiments, we assumed f = 0.2 (i.e., 80% of the servers are honest) unless indicated otherwise. We used 256 byte messages, similar to evaluations of prior systems [46, 45, 4] ; this is about the size of a standard SMS message or a Tweet. We used c4.8xlarge instances on Amazon EC2 for our experiments, which has 36 Intel Xeon E5-2666 CPUs with 60 GB of memory and 10 Gbps links.
We compare the results against three prior systems: Stadium [45] 1 Atom [30] , and Pung [4, 3] . For Stadium, we report the performance for e ε = 10 (meaning the probability of Alice talking with Bob is within 10× the probability of Alice talking with any other user) and allow up to 10,000 rounds of communication with strong security guarantees (δ < 10 −4 ), which are the parameters the used for evaluation in their paper. We show results for Pung with XPIR (used in the original paper [4] ) and with SealPIR (used in the followup work [3] ) when measuring user overheads, and only with XPIR when measuring end-to-end latency. We do this because SealPIR significantly improves the client performance and enables more efficient batch messaging, but introduces extra server overheads in the case of one-to-one messaging.
As mentioned in §2, the three systems scale horizontally, but offer different security properties from XRD. To summarize, Stadium provides differential privacy guarantees against the same adversary assumed by XRD. Stadium users can exchange up to 10,000 sensitive messages with strong privacy, while XRD users can do so for unlimited messages. Atom provides cryptographic sender anonymity [40] under the same threat model. Finally, Pung provides messaging with cryptographic privacy against a stronger adversary who can compromise all servers rather than a fraction of servers. To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any scalable private messaging systems that offer the same security guarantee under a similar threat model to XRD.
User costs
We first characterize computation and bandwidth overheads of XRD users using a single core of a c4.8xlarge instance. In order to ensure that every pair of users intersects, each user sends √ 2N messages ( §5.3.1). This means that the overheads for users increase as we add more servers to the network, as shown in Figure 2 and 3. This is a primary weakness of XRD, since our horizontal scalability comes at a higher cost for users. Still, the cost remains reasonable even for large numbers of servers. With 100 XRD servers, each user must submit about 54 KB of data. The bandwidth usage increases to about 238 KB of data with 2,000 servers. For 1 minute rounds, this translates to about 40 Kbps of bandwidth requirement. A similar trend exists for computation overhead as well, though it also remains relatively small: it takes less than 0.5 seconds with fewer than 2,000 servers in the network. This could be easily parallelized with more cores, since the messages for different chains are independently generated. The cover messages make up half of the client overhead ( §5.3.3).
User costs in prior works do not increase with the number of servers. Still, Pung with XPIR incurs heavy user bandwidth overheads due to the cost of PIR. With 1 million users, Pung users transmit about 5.8 MB, which is about 25× worse than XRD when there are fewer than 2,000 servers. Moreover, per user cost of XPIR is proportional to the total number of users (O( √ M) for M users): the bandwidth cost increases to 11 MB of bandwidth for 4 million users. The SealPIR variant, however, is comparable to that of XRD, as the users can compress the communication using cryptographic techniques. Finally, Stadium and Atom incur minimal user bandwidth cost, with less than a kilobyte of bandwidth overhead. Thus, for users with heavily limited resources in a large network, prior works can be more desirable than XRD. Lowering the user bandwidth cost in XRD so that it is comparable to prior systems is an interesting future direction.
End-to-end latency
Experiment setup. To evaluate the end-to-end performance, we created a testbed consisting of up to 200 c4.8xlarge instances. We ran the instances within the same data center to avoid bandwidth costs, but added 40-100ms of round trip latency between servers using the Linux tc command to simulate a more realistic distributed network.
We used many c4.8xlarge instances to simulate millions of users, and also used ten more c4.8xlarge instances to simulate the mailboxes. We generate all users' messages before the round starts, and measure the critical path of our system by measuring the time between the last user submitting her message and the last user downloading her message.
We estimate the latency of Pung with M users and N servers by evaluating it on a single c4.8xlarge instance with M/N users. This is the best possible latency Pung can achieve because (1) Pung is embarrassingly parallel, so evenly dividing users across all the servers should be ideal [4, §7.3] , and (2) we are ignoring the extra work needed for coordination between the servers (e.g., for message replication). For Stadium, we report the latency when the length of each mix chain is nine servers.
We focus on the following questions in this section, and compare against prior work:
• What is the end-to-end latency of XRD, and how does it change with the number of users?
• How does XRD scale with more servers?
• What is the effect of f , the fraction of malicious servers, on latency?
• What is the impact of the blame protocol on performance?
Number of users. Figure 4 shows the end-to-end latency of XRD and prior works with 100 servers. XRD was able to handle 1 million users in 128 seconds, and the latency scales linearly with the number of users. This is 12× and 2.1× faster than Atom and Pung, and 2× worse than Stadium for the same deployment scenario. Though processing a single message in XRD is significantly faster than doing so in Stadium (since Stadium relies on verifiable shuffle, while XRD uses AHS), the overall system is still slower. This is because each XRD user submits many messages. For example, each user submits 15 messages with 100 servers, which is almost equivalent to adding 15 users who each submit one message. Unfortunately, the performance gap would grow with more servers due to each user submitting more messages (the rate at which the gap grows would be proportional to √ 2N). While XRD cannot provide the same performance as Stadium with large numbers of users and servers, XRD can provide stronger cryptographic privacy.
When compared to Pung, the speed-up increases further with the number of users since the latency of Pung grows superlinearly. This is because the server computation per user increases with the number of users. With 2 and 4 million users, for example, XRD is 3.7× and 7.1× faster. For Atom, the latency increases linearly, but the performance gap still increases with more users. This is due to its heavy reliance on expensive public key cryptography and long routes for the messages (over 300 servers). Scalability. Figure 5 shows how the latency decreases with the number of servers with 2 million users. We experimented with up to 200 servers, and observed the expected scaling pattern: the latency of XRD reduces as 2/N with N servers ( §4.2). In contrast, prior works scale as 1/N, and thus will outperform XRD with enough servers. Still, because XRD employs more efficient cryptography, XRD outperforms Atom and Pung with less than 200 servers.
To estimate the performance of larger deployments, we extrapolated our results to more servers. We estimate that XRD can support 2 million users with 1,000 servers in about 84s, while Stadium can do so in about 8s. (At this point, the latency between servers would be the dominating factor for Stadium.) This gap increases with more users, as described previously. For Atom and Pung, we estimate that the latency would be comparable to XRD with about 3,000 servers and 1,000 servers in the network, respectively, for 2 million users. Pung would need more servers with more users to catch up to XRD due to the superlinear increase in latency with the number of users.
Impact of f . During setup, the system administrator should make a conservative estimate of the fraction of malicious servers f to form the groups. Larger f affects latency because it increases in the length of the chains k ( §5.2.1). Concretely, with n = 100, k must satisfy 100 · f k < 2 −64 . Thus, k > log(2 −64 /100) log( f )
, which means that the length of a chain (and the latency) grows as a function of Figure 6 demonstrates this effect. This function grows rapidly when f >> 0.5, and thus the latency would be significantly worse when considering larger values of f . Atom would experience the same effect since its mix chains are created using the same strategy as XRD. Stadium would face more significant increase in latency with f as its mix chains also similarly get longer with f , and the length of the chains has a superlinear effect on the latency due to expensive zero-knowledge proof verification [45, §10.3] . The latency of Pung does not increase with f since it already assumes f = 1.
Impact of blame protocol. The performance shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5 assume that no misbehavior was detected. While malicious users by themselves cannot deny service, they could send misauthenticated ciphertexts in an attempt to trigger the blame protocol, and slow down the protocol. Since malicious users are removed from the network when detected, they cause the most slowdown when the misauthenticated ciphertexts are at the last server. The performance of blame protocol also depends on how many users were caught this round. We therefore show the worst case latency increase due to blame protocol as a function of number of malicious users in a chain in Figure 7 with f = 0.2. The blame protocol requires two discrete log equivalence proof and decryption per user for each layer of encryption. Concretely, if 5,000 users misbehave in a chain, the blame protocol takes about 13 seconds to finish. This cost increases linearly with the number of users. For example, if 100,000 users misbehave in a chain blame protocol takes about 150 seconds.
(The later case, for example, corresponds to when a third of all users are malicious with 100 servers and 2 million users in the network.) While this is a significant increase in latency, malicious users can be removed from the network once malicious users are detected. Thus, to cause serious slowdowns across many rounds, the adversary needs large amounts of resources in order to constantly create new malicious users. Moreover, XRD remains at least 6× and 2× faster than Atom and Pung even with 100,000 malicious users in a chain. The faster version of Atom used for comparison in this paper (the trap message variant) does not protect against malicious user denial-of-service. Protecting against adversarial users would require at least 4× slowdown for Atom [30, §6] .
Availability
To estimate the effect of server churn on a XRD network, we simulated deployment scenarios with 2 million users and different numbers of servers. We assumed that all users were in a conversation, and show the fraction of the users whose conversation messages did not reach their partner in Figure 8. For example, if 1% of the servers fail in a given round (comparable to server churn rate in Tor [1] ), then we expect about 27% of the conversations to experience failure, and the end-points would have to resend their conversation messages. Unfortunately, the failure rate quickly increases with the server churn rates, reaching 70% with 4% server failures, as more chains contain at least one failing server. Thus, it would be easy for the adversary who controls a non-trivial fraction of the servers to launch a denial-of-service attack. Addressing this concern remains important future work.
When compared to Pung, the availability guarantees can be significantly worse, assuming Pung replicates all users' messages across all servers. In this case, the server churn rate would be equal to the user failure rate with users evenly distributed across all Pung servers, and the users connected to failing servers could be rerouted to other servers to continue communication. Atom can tolerate any fraction γ of the servers failing using threshold cryptography [17] , but the latency grows with γ. For example, to tolerate γ = 1% servers failing, we estimate that Atom would be about 10% slower [30, Appendix B] . Finally, Stadium uses two layers of parallel mix-nets (i.e., each layer is similar to XRD), and fully connects the chains across the two layers. As a result, even one server failure would cause the whole system to come to a halt. (Stadium does not provide a fault recovery mechanism, and the security implications of continuing the protocol without the failing chains are not analyzed [45] .) 9 Discussion and future work Multi-user conversations. In this paper, we focused on providing private one-to-one conversations. A natural extension would be to provide group conversations. XRD can already provide group conversations in scenarios where the users in a group chat intersect at different chains. For example, consider three users Alice, Bob, and Charlie who wish to have a private group conversation. If (Alice, Bob), (Alice, Charlie), and (Bob, Charlie) all intersect at different chains, then each user could carry out one-to-one conversation on two different chains to have a group conversation. The same mechanism can be used to have multiple one-to-one conversations as well. This could help amortize the cost per conversation since more than one of √ 2n messages would carry conversation messages. However, XRD currently cannot support multiple conversations for one user if she intersects with different partners at the same chain (e.g., Alice intersects with Bob and Charlie on the same chain). We wish to generalize XRD to multi-user conversations in the future.
Values of and load distribution. As discussed in §4, the number of chains each user selects is ≥ √ N, and our chain selection algorithm in §5.3.1 is a √ 2-approximation algorithm. It maybe possible, however, to find a better algorithm that yields lower , closer to √ N. This would result in proportional speed-up of XRD, up to √ 2× faster. Furthermore, since XRD only requires that all users intersect, we need not use the same for all users, or evenly distribute the load across all chains. If different users and chains have different capacities, it may be beneficial for performance to vary per user with uneven distribution of messages.
Conclusion
XRD provides a unique design point in the space of metadata private communication systems by achieving cryptographic privacy and horizontal scalability using efficient cryptographic primitives. XRD organizes the servers into multiple small chains that process messages in parallel, and can scale easily with the number of servers by adding more chains. We hide users' communication patterns by ensuring every user is equally likely to be talking to any other user, and hiding the origins of users' messages through mixnets. We then protect against active attacks efficiently using a novel technique called aggregate hybrid shuffle. Our evaluation on a network of 100 servers demonstrates that XRD can support 2 million users in 251 seconds, which is more than 3.7× faster than prior works with similar guarantees.
. We will now show that if the adversary can win this game, then it can also break Diffie-Hellman. Assume the adversary won the game. Let bsk A = ∏ i<h bsk i be the product of the private blinding key of the adversary. If the adversary won, then the first condition implies that (∏ msk h ), where KNOW(x) = 1 if the adversary knows (or can compute) x, and 0 otherwise. There are eight possible combinations of the predicates, and we consider each combination for j ∈ X H . We indicate which combinations are possible for the adversary to satisfy, given that all authenticated decryptions were successful.
Since the adversary does not know the key used to decrypt (i.e., (X j h ) msk h ), it cannot generate a valid ciphertext.
Since the adversary knows the key used to decrypt it could generate a valid ciphertext.
If possible, then the adversary can break the Diffie-Hellman assumption. Namely, given only X j 1 = g x j , bsk A , and (g bsk A ) msk h for random x j and msk h and an independently generated bsk A , it can compute (X j h ) msk h = g x j ·bsk A ·msk h . If this were possible, then given g a and g b for random a and b, the adversary could generate an bsk A , compute (g b ) bsk A , and compute g a·b·bsk A . It could then break the Diffie-Hellman assumption and compute g ab by raising g a·b·bsk A to bsk
bsk A ·msk h and (X j h ) msk h . However, the probability of this is negligible ( §3).
) msk h ) = 0: POS-SIBLE. This corresponds to untampered messages.
Same argument as case 4. Thus, there are two possible combinations of predicates:
. The first combination corresponds exactly to X T (tampered messages), and the second corresponds exactly to X H \ X T (untampered messages).
Similarly, consider j ∈ X A . The adversary generates the ciphertexts {c j h } for the verifier. Thus, the adversary must know (X j h ) msk h , the key used to authenticate the ciphertext, for j ∈ X A . Now, we consider the product of the users' Diffie-Hellman keys. Because all NIZKs have to be verified, we have that
. Consider X U = X H \ X T , i.e., the set of messages that did not change. Then, we can divide both sides by the values associated with X U since (X
We can rewrite this as
Based on our analysis of the possible predicates for X T and X A , the adversary must know (X j h ) msk h for j ∈ X T ∪ X A .
Moreover, the adversary knows log g (X j 1 ) for j ∈ X A (it was required to prove the knowledge in step 4 of the game). Thus, the adversary can compute ((X
This, however, is
where the last step uses the equality from equation 1. This means that given {X j 1 = g x j }, bsk A , and (g bsk A ) msk h for random {x j } and msk h , and bsk A that was generated independently of msk h , the adversary was able to compute g bsk A ·msk h ·∑ j∈X T x j . However, such an adversary can also break DiffieHellman. To see how, consider the following adversary A DH that tries to break Diffie-Hellman. A DH is given g a and g b for random a and b, and is asked to compute g ab . To compute this, A DH plays the above game setting g x 1 = g a and mpk h = (g bsk A ) b = (g b ) bsk A for bsk A of its choosing, and then simulates the client by generating many random x j for j ∈ X H \ {1}. At the end of the game, the adversary will have g bsk A ·b·(a+∑ j∈X T , j =1 x j ) . Since the adversary knows bsk A and x j for j = 1, j ∈ X T , it can compute
Thus, it can break Diffie-Hellman. Therefore, the adversary cannot win the above game if Diffie-Hellman is hard, meaning that it could satisfy at most two out of the three conditions to win the game. In turn, this implies that the honest server will always catch an upstream malicious server misbehaving.
B Security game and proof sketches
We define the security of our system using the following security game played between a challenger and an adversary. Both the challenger and the adversary are given the set of users [M] = {1, 2, . . . , M}, the set of servers [N], the fraction f of servers the adversary can compromise, and the number of chains n. 2. The challenger computes the size of each chain k as a function of f and n, as described in §5.2. Then, it creates n mix chains by repeatedly sampling k servers per group at random. The challenger sends the chain configurations to the adversary.
3. The adversary and the challenger generate blinding keys, mixing keys, and inner keys as described in §6.1 and Appendix A.
4. The adversary picks some honest users H t ⊂ H c such that |H t | ≥ 2. It generates sets of chains {C x } for x ∈ H t such that C x ∩ C y = / 0 for all x, y ∈ H t . For c ∈ [n], let U c = {x ∈ H t : c ∈ C x }. For each chain c, it also generates the potential messages {m yx from y to x with the keys of servers in chain c. Then, it uses the protocol described in §6.2 to submit the ciphertexts and the necessary NIZKs.
6. The adversary generates inputs to the chains for the users in A c , and sends them to the chains.
7. The challenger and the adversary take turns processing the messages in each chain. Within a chain, they perform the following for i = 1, . . . , k:
(a) If server i ∈ H s , the challenger performs protocol described in §6.3 to shuffle and decrypt the messages, and also generate an AHS proof. The challenger then sends the proof to the adversary, and the resulting messages to the owner of server i + 1. (b) If server i ∈ A s , the adversary generates some messages along with an AHS proof. Then, sends the AHS proof to the challenger, and sends the messages to the owner of server i + 1.
The challenger verifies all AHS proofs.
8. The challenger and the adversary decrypt the final result of the shuffle (i.e., the inner ciphertexts). We say that the system provides metadata private communication if the advantage is negligible in the implicit security parameter. Note that this game models a stronger version of XRD, which allows users to communicate with multiple users on different chains (i.e., what is described in §9), rather than only one user. We could change the game slightly to force the challenger to send loopback messages in step 5 to model having just one conversation.
Proof sketches. First, we argue that the adversary needs to tamper with messages prior to the last honest server shuffling, as stated in §6. To see why, consider an adversary that only tampers with the messages after the last honest server. The adversary can learn the recipients of all messages, but not the senders. As a result, the adversary does not learn anything about whether two users x, y ∈ U c received messages because there exists a conversation pair (x, y) c , or because there were two conversation pairs (x, x) c and (y, y) c . This means that any set of conversation pairs is equally likely to be sampled by the challenger from the adversary's view, meaning that the adversary does not gain any advantage. Thus, we consider an adversary who tampers with messages prior to the honest server processing the messages.
In this scenario, the adversary in step 7 must follow the protocol (e.g., no tampering with the messages), as analyzed in Appendix A. Given this restriction, we now argue that the adversary does not learn anything after playing the security game by describing how a simulator of an adversary could simulate the whole game with only the public inputs and the private values of the adversary.
The simulator can simulate step 3 by generating random public keys. It can simulate step 5 by generating random values in place of the ciphertexts that encrypt the users' messages {{m c xy }}, since the ciphertexts are indistinguishable from random. It then randomly matches a user in U c to one of the generated random values for each chain c, and sets the destination of each message as the matched user. It onion-encrypts the final message using the randomly generated public keys and the adversary's public keys. In step 7, the adversary simulates the challenger by randomly permuting the messages, and removing a layer of the encryption from the messages. (It can remove a layer of encryption since it knows all layers of onion-encryption.) Finally, it could simulate the challenger's last challenge by picking sets of randomly generated conversation pairs, subject to the constraints in step 5. The distribution of the messages generated and exchanged in the security game and in the simulator are indistinguishable for a computationally limited adversary.
